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Conviction, Nullification, and
the Limits of Impeachment
as Politics
J. Richard Broughton†
Abstract
The election of Donald Trump to the American presidency has
brought with it controversies that have prompted serious talk about
presidential impeachment. Even if an impeachment of President
Trump never comes to fruition, the national conversation about it has
revived the need for serious study of presidential impeachment—the
kind of serious study that took place twenty years ago during and
after President Clinton’s impeachment. This Article contributes to the
revival of academic literature on this subject by exploring the institutional role of the Senate as a court of impeachment. It gives attention to the Constitution’s mandate that the Senate decide whether the
impeached Party should be “convicted”—a term that is used elsewhere in the Constitution and always in the criminal law context.
Combined with other attributes of impeachment found in the constitutional text and historical understandings, the requirement of a “conviction” before removal helps give impeachment a criminal justice
character that mitigates, though does not destroy, its political
character. Accordingly, this Article argues that the political character
of impeachment is often overstated. The Senate is transformed into
something different than a conventional political or legislative body.
This Article therefore considers various approaches to deciding whether to convict, including one that views the Senator simply as finder of
factual guilt, one that combines a finding of factual guilt with a legal
finding that the offense is constitutionally impeachable, and another
approach that separates the normative value of removal from the
factual and legal conclusions. The Article further argues that considerations of raw partisanship or electoral politics as a basis for acquittal
are akin to a form of nullification similar to that found in the criminal
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law. In light of the quasi-criminal–quasi-judicial role that the Senate
plays as a court of impeachment, the importance of presidential
responsibility, and the need to protect the legitimacy of the Senate
and impeachment as a constitutional defense mechanism, the Senate
should be just as wary of partisan or politically-motivated acquittals,
whether overt or covert, as it should be of partisan or politicallymotivated convictions.
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Introduction
Impeachment talk is in the air. Again. To varying degrees of
seriousness, it has reared its head at various points over the past
twenty years.1 But Donald Trump’s election to the presidency has
revived serious impeachment conversation in the country, even if a
Trump impeachment seems, for the moment at least, relatively
unlikely. His ascendancy to the Oval Office brought with it concerns

1.

See Emma Roller, A Brief History of GOP Calls for Obama’s
Impeachment, From Benghazi to Bergdahl, Atlantic (June 3, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/a-brief-history-of-gopcalls-for-obamas-impeachment-from-benghazi-to-bergdahl/455544/ [https://
perma.cc/US7H-ZNLS]; Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service, For High Crimes and Misdemeanors,
H.R. Res. 494, 114th Cong. (2015); Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen,
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, For High Crimes and
Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 828, 114th Cong. (2016).
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about his private business dealings and his ability to comply with the
Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause;2 about his campaign’s
alleged connections to efforts by the Russian government to influence
the 2016 presidential election in Trump’s favor;3 his decision to fire
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and subsequent
statements that led some to wonder whether that action was an effort
to obstruct justice;4 and speculation that he may be planning a way to
fire, or thwart the work of, Special Counsel Robert Mueller.5 All of this
has provided fodder for an increasingly robust rhetoric of presidential
impeachment.6 Indeed, the phrase “constitutional crisis” has been uttered by many a commentator of late.7
2.

See Adam Liptak, Donald Trump’s Business Dealings Test a
Constitutional Limit, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-conflict-of-interest.html
[https://perma.cc/L8R7-E5YC]; Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
2017) (alleging that the President has violated the Foreign Emoluments
Clause). But see Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Yes, Trump
Can Accept Gifts, N.Y. Times (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/07/13/opinion/trump-france-bastille-emoluments.html [https://
perma.cc/2T6X-85WK] (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause
does not apply to the President or any other elected official).

3.

See, e.g., Josh Gerstein & Kyle Cheney, Senators Alarmed by Russian
Influence on U.S. Politics, Politico (July 26, 2017), http://www.politico.
com/story/2017/07/26/senators-russia-influence-us-politics-240983 [https://
perma.cc/7883-KVKN].

4.

See Charlie Savage, Trump, Comey and Obstruction of Justice: A Primer,
N.Y. Times (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/
us/politics/obstruction-of-justice-trump-comey.html [https://perma.cc/8JU
B-3PTL].

5.

See Peter Beinart, Why Trump Might Fire Robert Mueller, Atlantic
(July 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/
why-trump-might-fire-robert-mueller/534732/ [https://perma.cc/7UB4BWLF]. Notably, the President seemed to leave open this possibility in a
recent interview with the Wall Street Journal. See Josh Dawsey & Hadas
Gold, Full Transcript: Trump’s Wall Street Journal Interview, Politico
(Aug. 1, 2017, 6:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/01/
trump-wall-street-journal-interview-full-transcript-241214 [https://perma.cc/
B27K-RF3V] (stating that Trump said he has “no comment yet, because
it’s too early. But we’ll see.”).

6.

Consider, for example, the legal academic blogging on the matter. See Frank
O. Bowman, III, Impeachable Offenses?, https://impeachableoffenses.
net/ [https://perma.cc/XB9S-8APV]; see also Removal from Office,
Take Care Blog, https://takecareblog.com/other-topics/removal-fromoffice [https://perma.cc/E6HL-G9RP]; Conor Friedersdorf, The Case for
Impeaching Trump If He Fires Robert Mueller, Atlantic (July 24, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/impeach-donaldtrump-if-he-fires-robert-mueller/534585/ [https://perma.cc/G7XC-LX7M]
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The subject of impeachment more broadly is a subject that, of
course, overwhelmed the literature two decades ago. Perhaps we
learned some important lessons. Perhaps we thought that the
experience of the Clinton impeachment made it less likely that impeachments would form a significant part of the business of future
Congresses. Perhaps we believed that public officials would be more
careful about their official behavior. Perhaps we hoped that Congress
learned a harsh lesson about public perceptions of partisan impeachments.8
But the Trump presidency seems to have reignited interest in
impeachment. Perhaps, then, the Trump presidency has reminded
lawyers and legal scholars that we must not give up on impeachment
as a serious area of scholarly inquiry. Congress, after all, has not forgotten about impeachment. Impeachment talk has not been all bark
and no bite. Within the past decade, the Senate has convicted a federal judge—Thomas Porteus of Louisiana—on articles of impeachment,9 and had planned a trial on the articles of impeachment that
(arguing that the House “should immediately impeach the president” if he
fires Mueller).
7.

See, e.g., Is This a Constitutional Crisis?, Politico (May 9, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/09/comey-trump-firing-isthis-a-constitutional-crisis-215118 [https://perma.cc/N8GW-NKHD]; see also
Allan Smith, Democrats Warn of ‘Constitutional Crisis’ as Trump
Publicly Humiliates Own Attorney General, Bus. Insider (July 25, 2017,
5:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/democrats-fear-constitutionalcrisis-as-trump-steps-up-attacks-on-sessions-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/5SW
3-D7ZA]; Gregory Krieg, What’s a Constitutional Crisis—and Are We in
One?, CNN Politics (Jan. 31, 2017, 11:00 PM) http://www.cnn.
com/2017/01/31/politics/trump-executive-order-constitutional-crisis/index.
html [https://perma.cc/3ELL-FG9H]. Cf. Uri Friedman, America Isn’t
Having a Constitutional Crisis, Atlantic (May 11, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/constitutional-crisistrump-comey/526089/ [https://perma.cc/93YZ-S6B4] (citing sources that
urge caution about the term “constitutional crisis,” but warning that such
a crisis could arise).

8.

For evaluation of the perception that the Clinton impeachment was
strictly partisan, see Nicol C. Rae & Colton C. Campbell,
Impeaching Clinton: Partisan Strife on Capitol Hill 1 (2003). See
also Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan
Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const. L. Q. 161, 232 (2007). According
to a collection of CNN, USA Today, and Gallup polls, most Americans
believed that President Clinton should not be removed and that the two
parties in Congress would fight over impeachment rather than cooperate
with one another. Keating Holland, Poll: Strong Majority Do Not Want
Clinton Removed from Office, CNN (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.cnn.
com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/01/11/poll/ [https://perma.cc/239KAMMX].

9.

156 Cong. Rec. S8,607–11 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2010).
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the House approved against District Judge Samuel Kent of Texas,
before Judge Kent resigned instead.10 Of course, perhaps judicial impeachments raise somewhat different concerns than presidential ones.11
But the point is that these judicial impeachments show that Congress
still knows how to employ impeachment under the right circumstances, and not merely as a weapon for partisan advantage or
embarrassment of political opponents. Still, we know that the extreme
partisanship that prevails in the modern Congress can influence
impeachment work.12 For example, where the president and congressional majorities represent different parties, extremes in partisanship
could make impeachment of a president, or a presidential appointee, a
real possibility.13 By the same token, such extreme partisanship could
make it unlikely, if not virtually impossible, to impeach a president
when he is of the same party as the House majority, or to convict him
when he shares a political affiliation with the Senate majority.
Perhaps, then, though there are surely lessons to be learned from
judicial impeachments and though the legal standards may be the
10.

See Martha Neil, Federal Judge Samuel Kent Resigns, As Senate
Impeachment Trial Looms, A.B.A. J. (June 25, 2009, 10:05 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_samuel_kent_re
signs_as_senate_impeachment_trial_looms [https://perma.cc/GEU9-4A
JF]; Stewart Powell, Judge Kent’s Impeachment Came Fast and Furious,
Houston Chron., (June 19, 2009, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.
com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-Kent-s-impeachment-came-fast-andfurious-1729616.php [https://perma.cc/RT4K-E7A2].

11.

See Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 Hofstra L. Rev.
291, 303–04 (1999) (arguing that presidential impeachments differ from
those of other impeachable officers); see also Raoul Berger,
Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 3–4 (1973) (noting that
for the founding generation, impeachment of judges was “decidedly
peripheral”).

12.

See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance
of the Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 Hofstra L. Rev.
349, 364–66 (1999) (discussing the role of party unity and presidential
popularity in impeachments).

13.

For thoughtful commentary on the current state of congressional
partisanship, see Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even
Worse Than It Looks 3 (2012). See also Mickey Edwards, The
Parties Versus The People 4 (2012); Ronald Brownstein, The
Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed
Washington and Polarized America 10 (2007); Richard H. Pildes,
Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy
in America, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 273, 273 (2011). For an interesting
empirical evaluation of congressional partisanship, see Chris Cillizza, The
Story of How Congress Has Grown More Partisan—in One Amazing
Chart, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/10/31/the-story-of-congress-has-grown-more-partisanin-one-amazing-chart/ [https://perma.cc/S53S-A2CY].
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same,14 one can think about judicial and presidential impeachments
differently. This possibility is enhanced when you add the likelihood
of politically divided government in the political branches. Since the
Clinton impeachment, articles of impeachment were formally filed
against numerous public officials—in the George W. Bush Administration alone, articles of impeachment were filed against President
Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.15 During the
Obama years, articles of impeachment were filed against Attorney
General Eric Holder and IRS Commissioner John Koskinen.16 And,
now, at least one formal article of impeachment has been filed against
President Trump.17 Even beyond concerns about naked partisanship
and the reality of modern congressional politics, one cannot ignore the
possibility that Congress as an institution may at some point feel
legitimately compelled to protect itself and other institutions from a
President whose public conduct poses a threat to the rule of law, constitutional government, or the separation of powers. Partisan impeachment concerns aside, then, impeachment remains an essential
feature of our government of limited and enumerated powers, a
14.

See Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional
Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 Md. L. Rev. 59, 73–76 (2001)
(evaluating with skepticism the arguments for different standards);
Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 370–73 (same); Senator Jeff Sessions, Judicial
Independence: Did the Clinton Impeachment Erode the Principle?, 29
Cumb. L. Rev. 489, 490 (1999) (arguing that only a single standard for
impeachment exists).

15.

See Elizabeth B. Bazan, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700,
Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions,
Procedure, and Practice 19–20 (2010). For specific actions, see
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of High
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1258, 110th Cong. (2008); Articles
of Impeachment Against George Walker Bush, President of the United
States of America, and Other Officials, for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 1106, 109th Cong. (2006); Directing the
Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Alberto R. Gonzales,
Attorney General of the United States, Should Be Impeached for High
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 589, 110th Cong. (2007). All of
these were referred to a House committee, but no action was taken.

16.

Impeaching Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General of the United States, for
High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 411, 113th Cong. (2013);
Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 494,
114th Cong. (2015); Impeaching John Andrew Koskinen, Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R.
Res. 828, 114th Cong. (2016).

17.

Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High
Crimes and Misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 438, 115th Cong. (2017).
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legitimate and meaningful legislative weapon for assuring public
accountability to the Constitution and rule of law—its somewhat
troubled history notwithstanding. Legal scholarship therefore should
continue to urge understanding in this area, and not feel content to
leave impeachment permanently in the late-1990s.
Of course, the ultimate question is whether President Trump has
committed or will commit impeachable offenses—“treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors.”18 Again, much of the early
Trump presidency has been consumed by scandal and controversy.
With various scandals during the Trump presidency, talk of criminality has inevitably ensued.19 But impeachment is not concerned with
mere criminality. Its focus is abuse of the public trust,20 though this
may often intersect with criminality. Impeachment requires—indeed,
is the ultimate exercise of—careful and thorough congressional oversight and investigation of the executive, beyond what prosecutors and
other law enforcement officials may pursue. During the Trump presidency, then, congressional investigation and oversight of the executive
18.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

19.

See, e.g., Nick Akerman, Pile of Evidence Proves Trump Committed
Federal Crime in Attempt to Obstruct FBI Investigation, N.Y. Daily
News (June 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/evidence-proves-trump-committed-federal-crime-article-1.3229636
[https://perma.cc/FFU5-QZNY]; Jason Le Miere, Did Trump Break the
Law Over Alleged ‘Morning Joe,’ ‘National Enquirer’ Blackmail Threats?,
Newsweek (June 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trumpmorning-joe-blackmail-enquirer-630536
[https://perma.cc/HDF5-M739].
Recently, media reports indicated that the President was considering
broad use of his pardon power to insulate members of his family and staff,
and possibly, himself, from criminal prosecution related to the Russiainfluence investigation. This, too, provoked commentary on the potential
criminality of such an action. See Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump
Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-russia.html
[https://perma.cc/Q922-KJMJ].

20.

See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 571 § 798; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of
Impeachment History, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 603, 609–10 (1999)
(compiling prominent authorities who agree that “other high crimes and
misdemeanors” refers to conduct that need not be an indictable crime, but
rather is an abuse of power—a “political crime”); Ronald D. Rotunda, An
Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky.
L.J. 707, 725–26 (1987) (explaining why “American experience supports
the conclusion that an impeachable offense need not be a crime.”); Frank
O. Bowman III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, High Crimes & Misdemeanors:
Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1517, 1523 (1999) (noting the weight of authority
supporting the rule that impeachable offenses need not be crimes and
compiling sources).
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may be more significant than it has been in at least a generation.
Impeachment talk must therefore consist of more than simply whether
a particular presidential act constitutes an impeachable offense. Once
the House determines that an offense is at least impeachable, it must
determine whether to impeach.21 And even if it does so, the Senate is
presented with yet another complicated problem: assuming that an
impeachable offense is submitted, what must—or should—happen
next?
Consider the following hypothetical example. It is the final day of
the President’s—any President’s—impeachment trial in the United
States Senate. The House Managers have introduced massive amounts
of evidence over the course of two weeks. That evidence tends to show
that the President engaged in the very conduct that was the subject
of the articles of impeachment that the House approved. The President’s lawyers, in his defense, have been frustrated, unable to seriously counter the House’s proof of the alleged acts. In their closing statements, the President’s lawyers feel that they are left with the
following strategy: argue to the Senators that, despite proof that the
President engaged in conduct that amounts to an impeachable offense, he should not be removed from office. The argument is a
politically powerful one in light of several facts about the President’s
popularity and job performance. The President’s public approval ratings stand at about 55 percent, despite the impeachment. The national economy is growing, the military remains strong, and the President
has worked with Congress to achieve meaningful reform of tax and
international trade policy, and has even worked with the opposing
political party to secure passage of a major infrastructure bill. By all
objective measurements, his presidency has been successful. Must a
voting Senator convict the President if the Senator is persuaded that
the President committed the offense, and that it is an impeachable
one, even if the Senator personally believes that the President ought
to be permitted to remain in office because of his popularity and
accomplishments?
The answer to that normative question requires special focus on
the nature of impeachment, which, in turn, requires some focus on the
use of the words “convicted” and “conviction” in the various impeachment provisions of the Constitution. The impeachment clauses
provide the necessary text, but their scope and meaning raise questions. Article I, section 3 of the Constitution states that, upon
impeachment in the House and trial in the Senate, “no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members
present.”22 The next clause states that “the Party convicted” shall be
21.

See U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 5.

22.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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“liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment,
according to law.”23 Article II, section 4 says that the President, VicePresident, and all civil officers shall be “removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.”24 The process thus far seems clear: the
House impeaches the Party, the Senate tries and decides whether to
convict the Party. But when deciding whether to convict, must
removal from office form a distinct consideration?25 Should Senators
consider the political consequences of conviction? What, then, does it
mean to “convict” someone in this context?
In the ordinary criminal law use of the term, of course, it means
to find a party guilty; to impose a legally binding determination that
he has done as a matter of fact what is alleged.26 But find them guilty
of what, exactly? After all, the Constitution’s use of the term is not
limited to the impeachment context. Article III, section 3 provides
that “no person shall be convicted of treason except where there are
two witnesses to the same overt act or upon confession in open
court.”27 It seems clear that with respect to treason, to convict a
person of treason means to determine that she committed all of the
elements of treason—levying war against the United States or adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort—but only where the
evidence consists of the requisite witness testimony or confession in

23.

Id. at cl. 7.

24.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

25.

There exists some disagreement among scholars as to whether removal
from office is actually required on impeachment. Joseph Isenbergh, for
example, argued that impeachment was not limited to “treason, bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors,” and that the Senate could
convict an executive official for other misconduct but that removal from
office would be permitted but not be required. See Joseph Isenbergh,
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 53, 63–64 (1999); see also Douglas W. Kmiec,
Editorial, Convict, But Don’t Remove, Clinton, Wall St. J. (Jan. 29,
1999, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB917560066964106500
[https://perma.cc/QEC6-S6C8] (endorsing Isenbergh’s view). Substantial
authority concludes that impeachable offenses are limited to those
enumerated in the Constitution—treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors—and that removal is required. See, e.g., Susan Low
Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the Institutions
That Judged President Clinton, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143, 157
(2000) (arguing that the linkage of conviction and removal is
constitutionally mandated and any procedure for separating them is
unconstitutional).

26.

Convict, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

27.

U.S. Const. art III, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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open court.28 In the impeachment context, though, it is less textually
clear what the Senate is being asked to do when it is asked to vote to
convict or acquit an impeached Party. Can a Senator legitimately
vote to acquit an impeached party despite a belief—or even an affirmative finding—that the Party is guilty of doing what the House has
alleged in the articles of impeachment? The concern is that a Senator
will vote to acquit the impeached Party because—regardless of the
Party’s guilt as a factual matter—the Senator does not, as a political
matter, wish the Party to be removed from office, which conviction
would arguably require. This problem is especially acute with presidential impeachments because of concerns about “undoing”29 the national election of the unitary head of the executive branch. Following
the Clinton impeachment, Akhil Amar observed that a Senator could
not convict and remove President Clinton because the Senator’s constituents wanted Al Gore to be the president.30 But a different
question arises in this context: could the Senate decline to convict
President Clinton simply because it did not want Al Gore to be president, even if Senators believed President Clinton actually committed
impeachable offenses? What if today’s Senate preferred President
Trump to Vice President Mike Pence? Or what if the Senator
believed that his prospects for re-election, or his popularity in his
home state, would benefit from acquitting the President, notwithstanding a personal belief that the President in fact committed an
impeachable offense? We have heard about the dangers of partisan or
politically-motivated prosecutions and convictions, but should we also
be concerned about partisan or politically-motivated acquittals?
Consider the previous hypothetical, but now suppose that the
President has only middling popularity nationwide, or even that he is
deeply unpopular nationally, but won Senator X’s state overwhelmingly and remains highly popular with most voters there. Moreover,
suppose that voters in town hall meetings and through constituent
correspondence have informed Senator X that they expect her to work
closely with the President and to be loyal to both the President and
their shared political party. To make matters more complicated, the
President begins holding rallies in Senator X’s state in an effort to solidify his voter base and presumably increase pressure on Senator X to
defend him during the trial. Does—should—any of this alter the
Senator’s calculation on impeachment, if the Senator is nonetheless
persuaded that the President committed an impeachable offense?

28.

See id.

29.

Amar, supra note 11, at 311.

30.

Id. at 307.

284

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment as Politics

Assume that the Senator is moved by the political calculations
and votes not to convict. This practice may have an analogue in the
ordinary criminal law, albeit an imperfect one—jury nullification. Jury
nullification is the practice of jurors in a criminal trial refusing to convict a criminal defendant despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant’s guilt.31 Jury nullification has both a distinguished and
controversial history in the criminal law.32 As a matter of raw power,
jurors nullify, and this prevents re-prosecution pursuant to principles
of double jeopardy.33 Defenders argue that such a power is “a vital
component of democracy and its lawmaking function,”34 giving
citizens an important voice in the enforcement of a morally just
criminal law and serving as a safeguard against government oppression.35 Scholars have also demonstrated that common law juries, as
would have been known to the Framers, had the power to judge the
scope of the law in addition to the facts and therefore could acquit a
criminal defendant based on the jury’s own interpretation of the
applicable law.36
Critics, though, claim that jury nullification breeds disrespect and
disregard for the law and for a court’s instructions, undermines the
role of the judiciary in the constitutional system, and that moral concerns about a particular criminal law or its enforcement should be
addressed through other public institutions, such as the legislative
branch.37 Critics further note that even if jurors can nullify as an exercise of raw power, there is no such right to do so and courts should
not be complicit in encouraging it.38 So despite its pedigree and the
31.

See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 5–6 (4th ed.
2006).

32.

Id. at 6–7; see also Kaimipono David Wenger & David Hoffman,
Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115, 1129 (2003) (describing the
history of criminal jury nullification and stating that it was “extremely
popular in the colonies”).

33.

Dressler, supra note 31, at 5–7.

34.

Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 586 (2014).

35.

See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 Geo. L.J.
657, 687 (2012); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of
Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1149, 1152 (1997); Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale
L.J. 677, 713 (1995).

36.

See Carroll, supra note 34, at 588.

37.

See United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111–22 (D. Mass. 2008);
State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1369 (N.J. 1986).

38.

See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997); Crease v.
McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999); Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d at
120.
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claims of its defenders, modern criminal law and jurisprudence—and
some modern legal scholarship—often view jury nullification with significant skepticism and derision.39 Consequently, if Senators sitting as
a court of impeachment are engaged in a process analogous to that of
criminal jurors or even judges, then it is fair to question whether a
practice of Senatorial nullification is any more legitimate.
The major object of this Article, then, is to urge greater attention
to the institutional role of, and impeachment decision-making in, the
Senate. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the use of the words “convicted” and “conviction” in the impeachment clauses, highlighting the
overlap between impeachments and the criminal law. This Article
then places Senate decisions whether to convict into three categories:
the Anti-Nullification Approach, which bases the decision to convict
solely on a finding of factual guilt and accepts the House’s constitutional judgment as conclusive; the Independent Interpretation
Approach, which permits the Senator to consider both the factual
basis for guilt as well as to independently determine whether the
conduct constitutes “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors;” and the Political Nullification Approach, where the
Senator possesses a factual belief in guilt for what she deems to be
legitimately impeachable conduct, but declines conviction based solely
upon the political inexpediency of removal upon conviction. This
Article acknowledges that impeachment is “political,” rather than
strictly legal, but concludes that its political nature is often overstated. Rather, the Senate undergoes a transformation as a court of
impeachment. This transformation—which reflects the overlap of impeachment with traditional criminal law, protects the institutional
prerogatives of the Senate, and promotes presidential responsibility—
demands that a Senator, when deciding whether to convict, eschew
the kind of partisan or electoral considerations that form a part of the
Senate’s ordinary legislative business.

I. “Conviction,” Criminal Law Terminology, and the
Nullification Analogue
The ample scholarship on impeachment has not devoted considerable attention to the use of the terms “convicted” and “conviction” in
the impeachment clauses. Perhaps the use of these words is not
39.

See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614; Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 120; United States
v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Hatori, 990
P.2d 115, 122 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999); Holden v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1253,
1255 (Ind. 2003); Ragland, 519 A.2d at 1369; Lawrence W. Crispo, et al.,
Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1997); Steven M. Warshawsky, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy,
and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.J. 191, 192 (1996).
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terribly significant. However, the use of these terms may tell us something more about the character of Senate impeachment proceedings.
Placing this “conviction” terminology in context, this Part explores
the textual and structural significance of understanding the Senate as
a quasi-judicial—rather than strictly political—body when sitting as a
court of impeachment, and what this could mean for the institutional
role of the Senate when it decides upon conviction in impeachment
trials.
A.

Impeachment Trials as (Quasi) Criminal Justice

Impeachment, it is often noted, is not a strictly criminal
proceeding.40 This is in contrast to English impeachments, which were
more closely tied to criminality, as impeachment carried the possibility of death, prison, or significant fine.41 It is, as Joseph Story observed, a political one designed to protect the institutions of government by divesting the impeached party of his office, but not
imposing punishment.42 Alexander Hamilton, too, devoted considerable attention to the nature of impeachment in Federalist 65. There,
discussing the Senate’s role, Hamilton explained that impeachment’s
jurisdiction concerns “the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, the abuse or violation of some public trust.”43 Hamilton further
stated that impeachments are “with peculiar propriety . . . political,
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself.”44 The constitutional text plainly leaves criminal prosecution
and punishment as a distinct option once conviction and removal on
impeachment are finalized.45 And as Raoul Berger has noted, reading
impeachment as a criminal proceeding would potentially implicate a
number of constitutional limits unique to the criminally accused, such

40.

See Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of
Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 735, 789 (1999) (describing the Senate’s role as
“political”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to
Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 90 (1989);
Bowman & Sepunick, supra note 20, at 1563 (describing impeachment as
a political process).

41.

Berger, supra note 11, at 78.

42.

See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 573 § 803 (1987).

43.

See The Federalist No. 65, at 394, 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed., 1962).

44.

Id. at 394–95.

45.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
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as the double jeopardy bar and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury.46
And yet, while not formally “criminal” in the legal or constitutional sense, the overlap of impeachment with the criminal law
remains striking. The text on impeachable offenses uses the language
of criminality—“treason,” “bribery,” “high crimes and misdemeanors”47—even though there is compelling scholarly evidence to support
the proposition that the underlying act need not be a common law or
statutory crime to be impeachable.48 The President’s pardon power
applies to “offenses” against the United States, “except in cases of
impeachment.”49 Article III explains that the trial of all “crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury.”50 This provision, of
course, is subject to any change that the Sixth Amendment’s jury
trial guarantee works,51 but it nonetheless tells us something important about the thinking of the Framers with respect to the subjects of
impeachment. In addition, the Impeachment Clauses speak in terms of
a “conviction,” a term otherwise unique to a criminal setting.52 So
even if these provisions do not make the impeachment trial an ordinary criminal trial with all of its trappings and procedural safeguards,
they indicate that impeachment draws its core from the criminal law.
Hamilton’s description in Federalist 65 should not be taken to
mean that impeachments have a conventional political nature, unmoored from traditional criminal process. Recall that Hamilton says
impeachments may be denominated “with peculiar propriety” as
political, in the sense that they involve offenses against society.53 He
does not appear to use “political” to mean concern with raw politics
or electoral consequences; rather, his use of that term occurs in the
46.

See Berger, supra note 11, at 78–85.

47.

See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

48.

See generally Charles L. Black Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook 33–
34 (Yale Univ. 1974).

49.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

50.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

51.

See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (stating that in
any conflict between Article III, section 2 and the Sixth Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment must prevail).

52.

U.S. Const. art I, § 3. This is different, incidentally, than the problem
identified by other scholars related to the standard of proof. See, e.g.,
Black, supra note 48, at 16–17. Even if we identify the relevant standard
of proof for a conviction—say, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or clear
and convincing evidence—that still does not tell us to what question the
Senate must apply the relevant standard.

53.

The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 394.
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context of misconduct or abuse of office that constitutes an offense
against the state—political crimes; for example, treason and bribery.54
He also uses the term “conviction” as well as the term “prosecution”
to describe the process for trying impeachments.55
In light of these realities in the text and its intellectual history,
perhaps, as Charles Black has explained, the question is not whether
impeachment ought to be characterized as “criminal” or something
else, but whether there are certain aspects of impeachment that ought
to be treated the same as we treat them in criminal adjudication.56
This is not to say that impeachment commands no significance in
political, rather than legal, terms. As Jeffrey Tulis has thoughtfully
explained, the danger of over-legalizing impeachment is that such a
view ignores—or at least undervalues—the political understanding of
impeachment.57 According to Tulis, even though the Constitution
“does offer a kind of template for an analogy between the processes
for impeachment and conviction and those of indictment and trial,”58
it also separates impeachment from other legal processes.59 And despite creating a pretense of legality, the Constitution does this so as
to “structure an extraordinary political process—a process more elevated and less partisan than ordinary politics.”60 For Tulis, then,
impeachment should be understood as a particular kind of political
process, rather than a brazenly partisan one at one extreme or a
strictly legal one at the other. About this, Tulis is persuasive. But
even if it is desirable to avoid a hyper-legalization of impeachment,
one should not diminish the significance of impeachment’s legal aspects, particularly as they relate to the formalities of the criminal justice process. It is a hybrid of the political and the legal, a political
process moderated by legal formalities that give impeachment legiti-

54.

See Gerhardt, supra note 20, at 612 (explaining Hamilton’s use of the
term in connection with other historical sources that also referred to
impeachment as involving political crimes); see also Jonathan Turley,
Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian
Device, 49 Duke L.J. 1, 5 n.7 (1999) (explaining that the Senate’s use of
the word political is due to a misconstruction of Hamilton’s view).

55.

See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 397.

56.

Black, supra note 48, at 15.

57.

Jeffrey K. Tulis, Impeachment in the Constitutional Order, in The
Constitutional Presidency 229, 235–37 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey
K. Tulis, eds., 2009).

58.

Id. at 236.

59.

Id. at 236–37.

60.

Id. at 237.
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macy, sobriety, even gravitas. As Akhil Amar has observed, impeachment is “sensibly political as well as legal.”61
Regardless of how we characterize impeachment more broadly—as
criminal trial-like, or otherwise—the text’s multiple uses of the term
“conviction” strengthen the relationship of impeachment and criminal
law. This is especially true when we consider that it is the one term
used with respect to Senate impeachment trials that is exclusively
understood in the criminal context in other provisions of the Constitution: In Article III, when referring to a person being “convicted” of
treason,62 and in the Thirteenth Amendment, when referring to a
person “duly convicted” for a crime who may be punished by slavery
or involuntary servitude.63 For purposes of understanding what it is
that Senators do when they deliberate on articles of impeachment—
that is, when they decide whether to “convict”—it is sensible to draw
our understanding from criminal adjudication. Understanding the process of conviction and acquittal in the criminal arena demands some
reflection on nullification.
B.

Nullification in the Criminal Law

It has been said that nullification is appropriate because the jury
represents the “conscience of the community” in a criminal case.64 The
jury is representative of the community’s interest in justice, fairness,
and equality—values that nullification allows the community to
express through the mechanism of the jury.65 This is true, advocates
argue, even when the formalities of the criminal law would demand a
different result.66 Yet the arguments for nullification tend to arise
most forcefully in circumstances where the jury legitimately occupies
61.

See Amar, supra note 11, at 294; see also Keith Whittington, What Is the
Downside of Not Impeaching?, LawFare Blog (July 25, 2017, 12:00
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-downside-not-impeaching [https:
//perma.cc/DU54-4UU6] (discussing the kinds of politics at work in
impeachments).

62.

See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. Of course, a person may also be “convicted”
of treason in impeachment, rather than criminal proceedings, but Article
III appears to be describing treason in the context of criminal trial and
punishment in a federal court.

63.

U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.

64.

See generally Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2381, 2420 (1999) (stating that “the jury is frequently
referred to as the ‘conscience of the community,’ or variations on that
theme.”).

65.

See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 579, 622–26
(2014) (describing nullification as a reminder that laws obtain their values
from the people).

66.

See id. at 57.
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some reasonable and high moral ground, such as preventing government oppression or misconduct, exposing the injustice of a particular
law or its application against a particular defendant,67 or where a jury
engages in a form of legal interpretation that leads it to conclude that
the law does not apply in the particular case.68
Still, even those claims can find expression in other ways consistent with the forms of a constitutional democracy, such as by lobbying
for legislative change in the law, by forming strong public opposition
to a particular prosecution, or by taking one’s case to the ballot box.69
In addition, creating an atmosphere of permissiveness or even of affirmative endorsement with respect to nullification also creates the
possibility that jurors will nullify based on less worthy grounds, or
that such decisions will be based on arbitrary factors such as race, or
gender, or religion, or even on raw political grounds.70
Even the Supreme Court has referenced jury nullification disapprovingly. In Sparf v. United States,71 the Court held that defendants
lacked a right to a jury instruction on nullification power.72 In
Woodson v. North Carolina,73 the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment requires individualized consideration of a capital defendant’s crime and background, and thus forbids the government from
imposing a mandatory death penalty upon conviction of capital murder.74 One of the Court’s arguments against mandatory death penalties was the possibility that jurors who wanted to convict but did not
want the death penalty imposed might simply nullify, preferring ac-

67.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 35, at 1172–96 (discussing the relevance of
jury nullification in correcting government officials’ rule violations);
Adrien Leavitt, Queering Jury Nullification: Using Jury Nullification As a
Tool to Fight Against the Criminalization of Queer and Transgender
People, Seattle U. J. for Soc. Just. 709 (2012) (explaining why it is
morally justifiable for queer and trans jurors to use jury nullification to
subvert the criminal legal system); Butler, supra note 35, at 709–14
(encouraging African American jurors to take advantage of jury
nullification if, in their estimation, the operation of criminal law in the
United States does not advance the interests of black people).

68.

See Brown, supra note 35, at 1183.

69.

Cf. Warshawsky, supra note 39, at 216 (arguing that jury nullification
“proposes the unprincipled extension of interest group politics beyond the
state house and into the jury room”).

70.

See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997).

71.

156 U.S. 51 (1895).

72.

Id. at 74.

73.

428 U.S. 280 (1976).

74.

Id. at 303–05.
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quittal of a guilty defendant to the imposition of capital punishment.75
The context in which the Court made this argument was one that
strongly suggested disapproval of the practice.76 Finally, in Strickland
v. Washington,77 the Court held that defendants claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must prove both deficient performance by
counsel and prejudice to the defendant, describing nullification as an
example of “lawlessness” in determining how to apply the prejudice
prong of its holding.78 Consequently, even though jury nullification
may have an attractive pedigree and appeal in some academic
circles—and even exist with grudging acceptance—many influential
courts have not viewed it as broadly praiseworthy or desirable.79
Moreover, if the Senate is more like a court rather than a jury,
and impeachment trials are akin to a bench trial rather than a jury
trial, then the analogy to nullification is really to judicial nullification
rather than jury nullification. Recall that during the Clinton
impeachment trial, the Senate not only voted on the articles of impeachment but also voted on motions—as a judge, but not a jury,
would do. This included rejecting a motion to dismiss by a simple majority vote.80 And whatever pedigree jury nullification enjoys, a similar
one does not appear to exist for judicial nullification. Joshua Dressler
notes that the literature on judicial nullification is scant.81 The existing literature does not place judicial nullification on par with jury
nullification in terms of historical tradition or political value, though
it concedes that judicial nullification likely happens, perhaps with
75.

Id. at 293, 303.

76.

For example, when describing the history of jury attitudes toward
mandatory death penalties, the Court stated that jurors have “with some
regularity, disregarded their oaths” in refusing to convict defendants of
crimes that carried a mandatory death sentence. Id. at 293. The Court
also said that mandatory death penalties could exacerbate the problem of
arbitrary and capricious determinations of who lives and who dies “by
resting the penalty determination on the particular jury’s willingness to
act lawlessly.” Id. at 303.

77.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

78.

Id. at 695.

79.

See, e.g., Sparf v. United States. 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695; United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Kryzske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving
of the trial court’s refusal to instruct on nullification and statement that
there is no such thing as “valid jury nullification”).

80.

See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,017–18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999). This procedure
was approved in the resolution that established the procedures for the
trial. See S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999).

81.

See Dressler, supra note 31, at 6 n.37.
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some frequency.82 Indeed, the treatment that jury nullification has received in modern criminal law from many judges indicates why judicial nullification would be both rare and difficult to defend. As one
commentator wrote, “judges are repeat players in the justice system,
making judicial nullification more dangerous for the judicial system in
the long run.”83 The argument continues: “[a] judge’s routine refusal
to follow the law is more pernicious than a single verdict rendered by
twelve jurors, randomly selected from the community, who are then
released from service, unlikely to serve again in the near future.”84 Of
course, the rarity of impeachment raises the question of whether Senators really are repeat-players in the same way that judges are.
C.

Nullification in Impeachments

The notion of nullification in the impeachment conviction context
was advanced most directly by Jonathan Turley in his substantial
scholarship on the Clinton impeachment.85 But Turley’s nullification
idea was chiefly directed at the House acting in its capacity as both
quasi-grand juror and quasi-prosecutor.86 There is some reason to
82.

See id. (stating that judicial nullification “doubtlessly occurs on
occasion”); see also Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 Ind. L.J.
1281, 1281 (1993) (defending judicial nullification); Paula L. HannafordAgor, Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-Compliance
with Jury Improvement Efforts, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 407, 421–24 (2008)
(questioning the legitimacy of judicial nullification); M.B.E. Smith, May
Judges Ever Nullify the Law?, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1657, 1671
(1999) (observing that “judicial nullification does happen fairly often, and
sometimes, upon reflection, it seems clearly to have been the right
decision”).

83.

Hannaford-Agor, supra note 82, at 423.

84.

Id.

85.

See Turley, supra note 40, at 788. It is notable that the issue arose, albeit
in a different context, during the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in
1805. See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic
Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew
Johnson 60–70 (1992). One of the grounds for Chase’s impeachment was
that he refused to allow lawyers during the trial of John Fries to make
arguments about the law of treason to the jury that tried Fries. Id. at 63.
It is difficult, though, to read much into this historical footnote. On the
one hand, this suggests—indeed, it arguably confirms—that the founding
generation would have understood jury nullification in the form of
independent legal interpretation to be an acceptable and even desirable
practice. And yet, Chase was acquitted. We do not know the reasons the
Senators had for their votes. Id. at 108. But Chase’s acquittal on this
ground could suggest that his refusal to allow this kind of nullification
argument was either not improper or not a sufficiently serious breach of
the judicial role as to warrant conviction on impeachment.

86.

Turley, supra note 40, at 787.
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question whether the nullification analogy works well in that context,
or whether the House’s refusal to bring articles of impeachment is
simply more akin to an exercise of ordinary prosecutorial discretion.87
Turley briefly discussed the concept of nullification in the Senate and
conceded that if such nullification is to occur, then the Senate is
where it should occur.88 In fact, Turley argued that the Framers
“anticipated” a kind of jury nullification in the Senate because they
wanted the Senate to consider a variety of factors relevant to the
national interest in deciding whether to convict.89 Similarly—though
he did not use the terminology of nullification—Akhil Amar also
alluded to what functions as the nullification power of the Senate.
“Like trial jurors, Senators have the inherent power to acquit against
the evidence—to decide, as the conscience of the community, that
even if the charges are true, they do not warrant a conviction.”90
Again likening the Senators to an “ordinary criminal juror,” Amar
argued that “each Senator is free to be merciful for a wide variety of
reasons—because she thinks the defendant has suffered enough, or
because the punishment does not fit the crime, or because punishing
the defendant would impose unacceptable costs on third parties.”91
Still, the nullification analogue is not perfect. One manifestation
of jury nullification occurs when jurors interpret the law differently
than it is given to them in the judge’s instructions; there is an objective law that the jurors are instructed to, but do not wish to,
apply.92 This analogue makes sense in the impeachment context only
if we treat the House’s view of impeachability as carrying dispositive
weight. Otherwise, one might argue, Senators who disagree with the
impeachability of an official’s conduct are not really nullifying anything; they are exercising discretionary judgment about the meaning
of the law, which, arguably, the Constitution independently affords

87.

Susan Low Bloch’s testimony before the House Judiciary Committee’s
Constitution Subcommittee in 1998 also alluded to the concept of refusing
to impeach, even if the House had evidence that an impeachable offense
had been committed. See Background and History of Impeachment:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 232 (1998) (statement of Susan Low Bloch).
Again, though, Bloch appears to be discussing what amounts to the
exercise of discretion, rather than jury nullification.

88.

Turley, supra note 40, at 788.

89.

Id. at 788 n.277.

90.

Amar, supra note 11, at 311.

91.

Id. at 307.

92.

See Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999).
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them.93 And yet, if a Senator agrees with the House, accepts the impeachability of the conduct, and believes that the official has committed the conduct alleged, then the decision not to convict more
closely approaches a form of nullification—such as where a juror refuses to convict because she does not approve of the punishment that
the defendant would face upon conviction. The analogy seems even
more appropriate where the Senator refuses to convict on grounds
that have nothing to do with the facts or the law.
Moreover, the comparison with ordinary jury nullification is arguably limited by the structural attributes of the Senate. After all, once
you concede that impeachment trial is emphatically not a criminal
trial and that impeachment is political as well as legal, then a rationale exists for defending Senatorial nullification that perhaps does not
exist for defending criminal jury nullification. Consider, for example,
the incident during the Clinton impeachment in which one of the
House Managers, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, referred to the
Senators as “jurors.”94 Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa raised an immediate objection, arguing that the Senators were not “jurors,” but
rather, Senators, meaning that they had a role that ordinary criminal
jurors do not.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist sustained the objection,
admonishing the House Managers that the Senate was sitting as a
“court” and the Senators were not mere jurors.96 To some extent, the
Harkin objection was a sensible one and highlights what is the
conventional wisdom on the Senate’s role: impeachment is ultimately
different than a criminal trial and Senators must exercise judgments
that we do not expect an ordinary lay jury in a criminal case to
exercise. But does that include judgments that amount to a kind of
Senatorial nullification?97
Finally, why does it matter? After all, impeachments are largely
immune from judicial review,98 and there always remains the somewhat cynical view that a Senator, believing his or her decision to be
93.

See U.S. Const. art I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole power to
try all impeachments.”).

94.

145 Cong. Rec. S279 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Barr as
House Manager).

95.

Id. (statement of Sen. Harkin).

96.

Id. (statement of Rehnquist, C.J., presiding).

97.

See generally Turley, supra note 40 at 788. This was also the view of
many other Senators during the Clinton impeachment. See infra Part
III.A.

98.

See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 244 (1993) (“[T]he Framers’
conferred upon Congress a potential tool of legislative dominance yet at
the same time rendered Congress’ exercise of that power one of the very
few areas of legislative authority immune from any judicial review.”).
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essentially unreviewable, will simply do as she pleases based on her
personal political calculations. There is arguably no downside to
engaging in ad hoc judgments, even nakedly political ones. A Senator
who does not want an official, such as the President, removed will
simply vote to acquit regardless of the evidence and the objective
merit of the House’s allegations. Perhaps. But a few reasons exist to
pursue this matter further.
First, at a somewhat more abstract level of formal constitutionalism, the constitutional processes of impeachment are legitimate—
and worthy of respect—only if Senators abide by an understanding of
those processes that conforms to constitutional text, structure, and
history, beyond their partisan predilections. Impeachment is a serious
and sobering constitutional moment for the Senate and the Nation.
The constitutional legitimacy of impeachment and the institutional
legitimacy of the Senate are subject to doubt if a Senator is engaged
in merely ad hoc decision-making or a judgment based solely on partisan or electoral calculations without regard to the underlying facts
and applicable constitutional law. As explained later in this Article,
there are reasons to think that the text and structure of the Constitution contemplate that the Senator’s discretion will be guided by,
and his or her thought processes channeled through, institutional formalities not unlike those that guide the decision-making of a factfinder or judge in a criminal trial.99 Moreover, at a less abstract level,
if the analogy to nullification is correct, then the issue is an important
one because nullification is an extremely controversial—and for many,
even deeply troubling100—phenomenon. If there are reasons to object
to jury nullification at the conviction stage of an ordinary criminal
case, then there are reasons to at least hesitate about applying similar
types of nullification at the conviction stage of an impeachment trial,
even if we concede the differences between criminal trials and impeachments.

II. Senate Practice and the Competing Approaches to
“Convicting” on Impeachment
The Senate’s role as a court of impeachment is unique in the
constitutional scheme. Consistent with the notion that impeachment
is not strictly criminal or even strictly legal, and without clarity as to
how one precedent binds future voting, it is important to evaluate historical practices in Senate impeachments with respect to the approach
of various Senators in deciding whether to convict. In so doing, one
99.

See Turley, supra note 54, at 125–27.

100. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (citing judicial and scholarly
sources opposing nullification).
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can find which patterns emerge and ask whether they are consistent
with our constitutional architecture.
A.

Views from Presidential Impeachment Trials

The disconnect among Senators as to what it means to “convict”
an impeached party is apparent in the history of impeachments. The
Clinton impeachment provides the most obvious, and compelling, examples. Recall that President Clinton was tried on two distinct
articles of impeachment in the Senate. The first article of impeachment alleged that President Clinton gave “perjurious, false, and misleading testimony” to a grand jury arising out of his relationship with
former Arkansas employee Paula Jones.101 The second article of impeachment alleged that President Clinton obstructed justice by concealing information that related to Jones’ sexual harassment lawsuit
against him.102 Of course, he was acquitted on each of these articles:
forty-five Senators voted to convict on the first article, and fifty voted
to convict on the second article.103 This Article surveys a few examples
of the Senators’ approaches.
In an opinion piece for the Washington Post arguing against the
adoption of “findings of fact” in place of a single vote on conviction
and removal, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia stated his view
that “senators must answer not one but two questions: is the president guilty or not guilty of committing high crimes and misdemeanors, and if he is guilty, do his actions warrant removal from office?”104
Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota later endorsed Senator Byrd’s
view.105 Arriving at much the same conclusion but through a different
formulation, Senator Slade Gorton of Washington saw the Senate’s
job as answering four questions: Did the House prove the facts alleged
in the articles?; Do those facts establish the elements of the alleged
crimes?; Are the alleged offenses high crimes or misdemeanors?; And
101. Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton:
Constitutional Provisions; Rules of Procedure and Practice in
the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials; Articles of
Impeachment Against President William Jefferson Clinton;
President’s Answer; and Replication of the House of
Representatives, S. Doc. No. 106-2, at 15–16 (1st Sess. 1999).
102. Id.
103. For a complete breakdown of the roll call, see How the Senators Voted on
Impeachment, CNN (Feb. 12, 1999, 12:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/02/12/senate.vote/ [https://perma.cc/WBZ
9-QKFJ].
104. Robert C. Byrd, Don’t Tinker With Impeachment, Wash. Post, Feb. 3,
1999, at A17.
105. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,118 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Dorgan).
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finally, even if the facts establish that the president committed a high
crime or misdemeanor, is the offense of sufficient gravity to warrant
conviction and removal?106 Under Senator Gorton’s formula, even if
the Senate answers the first three questions in the affirmative, it has
not yet “convicted” the president. Rather, “conviction” only occurs
once it is determined that the offense was severe enough to justify
removal.
Senator Susan Collins of Maine stated her view of the problem:
“the Framers wanted the Senate to make not only a determination of
guilt, but also a judgment about what is best for our nation and its
institutions.”107 Applying this standard, Collins voted not guilty on
article one because she found the evidence insufficient, but not guilty
on article two because she believed that obstruction of justice did not
amount to a high crime or misdemeanor under the circumstances.108
Notably, Collins said if she were a juror in a criminal case, she might
“very well vote to convict faced with these facts.”109 She decided
against conviction on impeachment because for impeachment the
Senate was required to conclude from the evidence “with no room for
doubt” that injury would be done to the Constitution and to the
Republic if the President remained in office.110 Senator Collins also
suggested a bifurcation, in which conviction and removal would be
subjected to distinct votes, leading Professor Susan Low Bloch to suggest that Senator Collins had been influenced by Joseph Isenbergh’s
article that made this argument.111 Bloch and other prominent legal
scholars objected to this suggestion in light of the Constitution’s
command that the Senate “shall” remove the President upon “conviction,” and the Senate did not permit it.112 Bloch articulated the ultimate “multifaceted” question this way: “[d]id the alleged behavior
occur and does it constitute a ‘high crime and misdemeanor’ warranting removal?”113
Consider also Maine Senator Olympia Snowe’s nuanced interpretation of the questions that the Senate must ask and answer. As
106. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
107. Id. at S1,568 (statement of Sen. Collins).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 157 (2000). For Isenbergh’s argument, see
Isenberg, supra note 25, at 90.
112. Bloch, supra note 25, at 157–58 (citing opposition by Laurence Tribe and
Robert Bork).
113. Id. at 159.

298

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment as Politics

Senator Snowe articulated it, the Senate must decide “whether there
is evidence that persuades us, in my view beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the President’s offenses constitute high crimes and misdemeanors
that require his removal.”114 She ultimately voted against conviction
on both of the articles of impeachment, although she concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton had committed the
underlying conduct alleged in one of the articles—presumably article
II on obstruction of justice.115 She did not separately decide whether a
high crime or misdemeanor had been committed, and if so, whether it
warranted removal. Rather, her view appeared to accept the reality
that if the offense is a high crime or misdemeanor, then the President
must be convicted and removed once factual guilt is determined.116
She determined, however, that his conduct did not constitute a high
crime or misdemeanor.117 She asked whether “the President’s misconduct, even if deplorable, represent[s] such an egregious and immediate
threat to the very structure of our Government that the Constitution
requires his removal.”118 She answered that question in the negative.119
Similarly, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont stated his view that,
although he was persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that
President Clinton gave false testimony during his deposition, “the
President lied to avoid embarrassment. However, the Framers did not
envision such behavior as being encompassed within the phrase ‘other
high crimes and misdemeanors.’”120
Contrast these approaches with those of the Senate during the
impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, who was acquitted
on multiple articles of impeachment, almost all of which arose out of
President Johnson’s alleged violations of the Tenure of Office Act.121
Johnson fired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and replaced him with
an interim secretary, Lorenzo Thomas, without the advice and consent of the Senate which was required by the Act.122 Some senators,
114. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,669 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Snowe).
115. See id. at S1,671.
116. See id. at S1,670 (“If I conclude that this President’s conduct is of that
nature, I would vote to remove him.”).
117. See id. at S1,671.
118. Id. at S1,670.
119. See id. at S1,671.
120. Id. at S1,597 (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
121. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 143–248; Michael Les
Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (1973).
122. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 212–16.
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like Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and James Grimes of Iowa, were political adversaries of Johnson but concluded simply that the House had
failed to prove any impeachable conduct by the President.123 In contrast, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts voted to convict on
all articles, explaining his view that an “impeachment” is “political,”
and “belongs to the Senate, which is a political body,” whereas a proceeding “according to law” is “judicial, and belongs to the courts,
which are judicial bodies.”124
Interestingly, and contrary to the view that impeachment trials
are essentially political in nature, both Trumbull and Grimes viewed
the impeachment trial as essentially judicial in its character.125 So,
too, did others. Republican Senator George Edmunds of Vermont,
known for his rigorous legal thinking and who ultimately voted to
convict Johnson, also explained his view that his duties were “clearly
judicial,” and that he would not concern himself with any of the
political consequences of his decision whether to convict.126 He further
explained that it was the members of the House, acting as a kind of
grand jury, that were to be the “sole judges” of whether a violation of
law amounted to a prosecutable—meaning, in this context, impeachable—offense.127 The House having done so, Edmunds explained, “we
have only to apply the law as it is to the facts proved. We have no
discretion to say guilty or not guilty according to our views of expediency or our personal wishes.”128 Senator William Fessenden of Maine
made a similar point with respect to the judicial nature of the impeachment trial, but unlike Edmunds, ultimately found that the
House had failed to prove any impeachable conduct. Rather, like
Grimes, Fessenden concluded that Johnson’s removal of Stanton
based on his construction of the Tenure of Office Act was at least
debatable and thus should not subject him to conviction.129 Senator
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland—also known as a leading constitutional
lawyer of his time—in explaining his vote to acquit Johnson on all of
the articles because the House had failed to prove them, described the
123. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. 419–24 (1868) (statements
of Sens. Trumbull and Grimes). For his part, Senator Trumbull also
stated that one of the articles—the tenth—did not “afford just grounds
for impeachment.” Id. at 420.
124. Id. at 463 (statement of Sen. Sumner).
125. See id. at 420 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (expressing that the decision
to impeach should not be partisan); id. at 424 (statement of Sen. Grimes).
126. Id. at 424 (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 452–57 (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
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Senate as a “court” and stated explicitly that the Senate “is now acting in a judicial character. The judgment which it may pronounce as
regards the respondent will be final.”130 Johnson, a Democrat, also
vowed to dismiss partisan considerations, as well as the contention
that an acquittal would result in “civil commotion and bloodshed.”131
Many of the statements from the Johnson impeachment create the
image of a Senate impeachment trial as distinctly judicial, and still
more urged that it be removed from partisan or other political considerations.132 Yet—and recall the question posed earlier, as to whether
acquittal of President Clinton would have been appropriate, even if he
were guilty, simply because the Senate did not want Al Gore to be
President—it is also significant to note the consequences had the
Senate convicted Johnson. Pursuant to then-existing rules of presidential succession, and because there was no vice-president, Johnson’s
conviction and removal would have meant the elevation of Senate
president pro tempore Benjamin Wade of Ohio to the presidency.133
This would have been an unpopular result across the political spectrum,134 and even Senator Edmunds later speculated that several of
his colleagues would likely have voted to convict Johnson had Wade
not been the next in line to succeed Johnson.135 So even if the respective statements by those who voted to acquit President Johnson
do not reveal the kind of overt nullification theories addressed here,
there remains evidence that a kind of nullification may have been at
work in the Johnson acquittal, and perhaps in the Clinton acquittal,
as well.
130. Id. at 431 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., id. at 420 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (detailing political
disagreements with Johnson but voting nonetheless to acquit).
133. See Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). See
also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Unconstitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 123 (1995)
(discussing Wade’s role in the Johnson impeachment).
134. See Rehnquist, supra note 85, at 246–47 (stating that both Republicans
and Democrats were uncomfortable allowing Wade to become President
because he supported progressive causes). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
account of the trial also states that there were “rumors” regarding efforts
by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who presided, to secure votes against
Johnson’s conviction, presumably because Wade had failed to support
Chase’s run for the presidency in 1860. Id. at 247. It was never proven
that Chase tried to secure these votes, but, as Rehnquist states, “Chase’s
overweening ambition for the presidency lent credibility to” the rumors.
Id.
135. See Benedict, supra note 121, at 141.
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B.

Categorizing the Approaches to “Convicting” on Impeachment

Based on this admittedly incomplete history of senatorial practices in voting on presidential impeachments, there is a hodgepodge of
approaches as to whether the Senator should “convict.” What is relevant is not just the question that each Senator must ask herself when
voting on the articles of impeachment. Rather, it is whether a purely
political consideration—one that does not relate to the purely factual
question of whether the President did what is alleged nor to the legal
definitional question of whether the act constitutes treason, or bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor—can be a dispositive factor in
how the Senator votes. Although judicial impeachments may shed
some light on senatorial voting patterns, removing the unitary head of
the executive branch, in whom all executive power is vested, and particularly one who has been elected in a free and fair—but also
partisan—election, creates opportunities for the contemplation of
partisan politics in ways that judicial impeachments might not.136 As
a practical matter, then, the issue is the extent to which the normative removal question is, or ought to be, considered when answering
the other, primary questions.
Because of the hodgepodge of approaches taken by Senators in
presidential impeachments, some of which bleed into one another, it is
difficult to create a perfect taxonomy. This Article does not purport
to do so. Nonetheless, three distinct approaches emerge that are relevant to the thesis considered here. One approach may be referred to
as the Anti-Nullification Approach, which considers only whether factual allegations have been proven. A second approach may be called
the Independent Interpretation Approach, in which the Senator may
engage in a legal determination that differs from that of the House
with respect to the impeachability of the alleged offense. A third may
be called the Political Nullification Approach, which is the approach
that explicitly or implicitly considers the normative value of removal,
and appears to be the approach that can mimic the more objectionable aspects of nullification.
The Anti-Nullification Approach—perhaps it should be called the
Edmunds Approach—would posit that “convict” has its conventional
criminal law meaning: It means to find the Party guilty by determining that the Party committed the acts alleged by the House;
136. Cf. Turley, supra note 54, at 70. Turley examines the history of factional
disputes in judicial impeachments, and states that such factional disputes
also exist “in modern cases.” Id. He gives the example of judges subjected
to calls for impeachment based on their judicial activism. See id.. See also
Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 Wm. & Mary.
Bill Rts. J. 595, 598 (2010) (considering whether judicial impeachment
might be used as a way to “deselect” judges so as to make room for new
appointments).
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removal is then incidental to that finding but forms no necessary part
of it. The only job of the Senate at the verdict-conviction phase is,
like a criminal jury, to determine the facts: Did the impeached Party
do what the House alleges in the articles of impeachment? If not, then
acquittal is required;137 but if so, conviction is required. This approach, then, would not permit the Senate to engage in any conclusions of law—deferring to the “sole” power of the House to impeach,138
and thus, on this view, to determine what is impeachable—nor any
normative judgments about the wisdom of removal, but rather would
place the Senate in the position of a typical modern criminal jury that
does not exercise any nullification power.
A second approach—the Independent Approach—holds that to
“convict” means to find the Party guilty by determining that the
Party committed the acts alleged and that those acts constitute treason, bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor; removal from office is
then incidental to this finding, and the Senator does not make a distinct express determination about it. Bloch appears to advocate this
approach,139 as did Laurence Tribe,140 and Charles Black briefly mentions this approach in his impeachment handbook.141 Black says that
each Senator must answer two questions: “‘Did the president do what
he is charged in this Article with having done?’ ‘If he did, did that action constitute an impeachable offense within the meaning of the constitutional phrase?’”142 Black acknowledges that these questions combine law and fact, such that the Senator is acting as both a judge and
a fact-finder.143
In the impeachment context, the Senator using this approach is
substituting his own interpretation for that of the House, which, by
submitting the article of impeachment to the Senate, has already determined conclusively, for purposes of fulfilling the House’s role, that
the alleged conduct is impeachable under Article II, section 4. Again,
the analogue to nullification here seems awkward. If the Senate pos137. Of course, a number of Senators concluded during the Clinton
impeachment that the House failed to establish the President’s factual guilt
on one or both articles. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,539 (daily ed. Feb.
12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Specter); id. at S1,595 (statement of Sen.
Jeffords); id. at S1,479 (statement of Sen. Biden).
138. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
139. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 159.
140. See id. at 157 n.71 (noting Tribe’s view as expressed in a New York Times
piece by David Rosenbaum).
141. Black, supra note 48, at 13.
142. Id.
143. See id.

303

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment as Politics

sesses independent power to interpret the meaning of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,” then its mere disagreement with the House would not seem to be nullification of anything;
that is, if the House does not have the power to instruct the Senate
on what constitutional law is binding, then there is nothing to
“nullify.” Indeed, Hamilton’s defense of the Senate’s role in Federalist
65 explicitly states that the Senate should not be “tied down by such
strict rules . . . in the construction of [the alleged offense] by the
judges[, that is, the Senate].”144 Rather, this approach would only
constitute nullification if one assumes that in exercising the “sole”
power of impeachment145 the House necessarily has the sole power of
giving binding law to the Senate. Even if that is true, then this approach at least has the virtue of consistency with a view of jury nullification from the time of the Framing that would have allowed jurors
to engage in legal interpretation that is at odds with the given law.146
This would then be objectionable only if the Senator is persuaded that
the legal judgment is one to be made by the House only, and that the
Senate may not properly decide what is and is not a high crime or
misdemeanor.
A third approach—the Political Nullification Approach—holds
that “convict” means to determine that the Party has committed an
act; that the act is treason, bribery or a high crime or misdemeanor;
and that the impeached party, having committed such an act, should
be removed from office. This approach differs significantly from the
other two because it includes a normative judgment, rather than a
strictly factual or strictly legal determination. This is the approach
that Senator Byrd and some others urged during the Clinton impeachment proceedings.147 Others seemed to engage in distinct deliberation upon the question of removal, but it was unclear whether
they were tying this to the question of impeachability or considering
144. The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 398.
145. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
146. See Carroll, supra note 34, at 588. But see Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry
Into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial
America, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 111, 212 (1998) (finding that
the approach may have varied from state to state, and that it is difficult
to discern whether there was a generally accepted right of nullification in
each state).
147. See, e.g., Byrd, supra note 104; 145 Cong. Rec. S1,479 (daily ed. Feb.
12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Biden) (voting to acquit based on his view
that the House failed to prove the alleged offenses, although he discussed
removal as a distinct consideration); see also Turley, supra note 40, at
787; Amar, supra note 11, at 307, 311 (arguing that Senators could acquit
even if they believed that the president did what is alleged, on grounds of
mercy).
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it separately.148 The key difficulty with Political Nullification, and the
one on which this Article focuses, occurs when it is used for raw partisanship or political expediency. But this may be precisely when it is
most difficult to detect, where partisan or political motivations are
hidden but nonetheless made effective through other approaches or
forms of argument.149
C.

Evaluating the Approaches to “Convicting” on Impeachment

There is a meaningful difference in these various approaches.
When the House impeaches, it is imposing its constitutional judgment
that the conduct is worthy of impeachment, conviction, and, necessarily, removal upon conviction. The Anti-Nullification Approach is
strictly factual and gives absolute deference to the House’s constitutional judgment. If the Senate ought to determine whether to “convict” based on the Political Nullification Approach, then the comparison to modern variants of jury nullification is appropriate where a
Senator decides that the Party is guilty of underlying impeachable
conduct but should not be removed from office. In both the Independent and Political Nullification Approaches, the Senator is reserving power to dispute the legal judgment of the House. The Independent Approach, though, stops at this level of discretion. Political
Nullification goes further by taking issue with the connection between
conviction for an impeachable offense and removal. For if the party is
convicted of treason, bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor, then
arguably the text already assumes that removal is appropriate.150 The
Senate need not make this judgment independently because the Constitution has already fixed that consequence. This aspect of Senatorial
nullification practice is akin to a criminal juror deciding not to convict
someone of first-degree murder, which the relevant jurisdiction punishes by a mandatory term of life in prison, because the juror knows
148. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,555 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Thompson). Senator Fred Thompson of Tennessee voted to convict
on Article II, but as to Article I, he found that grand jury perjury had
been proven but then said, “[t]he question then is whether these examples
of perjury warrant removal of the President for the commission of high
crimes and misdemeanors.” Id. “In my opinion,” he said, “these
statements, while wrong and perhaps indictable after the President leaves
office, do not justify removal of the President from office.” Id.
149. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 169, 176 (2000) (discussing
why it is undesirable for Senators to mask political motivations in
impeachments).
150. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,475 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Lugar) (“With few exceptions, Senators recognize that the Constitution
gives only one outcome to a verdict of ‘guilty,’ namely, removal from
office.”).
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the sentence and does not want the person to serve life in prison—not
because the defendant did not commit the facts underlying the crime
and not because the government was unable to prove that a first-degree murder occurred.151 Indeed, in the taxonomy articulated here,
Political Nullification takes this problem even a step further, if the
Senator is using her own calculations about her or the President’s
political fortunes when rendering her decision. A judgment about the
consequences of a conviction is quite different from a judgment about
whether to convict in the first instance.
Political Nullification, then, appears to be less desirable than the
other approaches when viewed in light of the constitutional text’s requirement that Senators make a decision to “convict,” and in light of
the institutional role that the Senate plays when it acts as a court of
impeachment. Of course, there are grounds on which to defend something like this: first, on a constitutional interpretation that understands the removability question as distinct from the conviction question; and second, on the ground that both conviction and removability should be determined based on higher-level national interests
rather than any parochial political or electoral concerns.152 After all,
not all political considerations are created equal.153
In other words, on one view, political nullification becomes
legitimate—indeed, it ceases to look like nullification at all—if the
Senate has the independent constitutional authority to decline to remove the president even where there is a finding of guilt for an impeachable offense. In the Senate impeachment trial context, though,
substantial authority suggests that “conviction” and “removal” are
not distinct concepts, just as the Senate and other legal scholars recognized when rejecting the bifurcation approach in the Clinton
impeachment trial.154 A Senator bent on judging the political wisdom
151. For more on this phenomenon, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment
Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the
Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2223 (2010) (discussing the
phenomenon of nullification where juries know the sentencing options
available upon conviction). Of course, unlike many jurors, Senators
already know the consequences of conviction at the time of voting.
152. See Turley, supra note 40, at 788 (defending “jury nullification” in the
Senate and separating conviction from removal); Amar, supra note 11, at
307 (explaining the role of mercy in Senate impeachment judgments).
153. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61 (distinguishing low, high, and constitutional
politics during impeachment).
154. See Bloch, supra note 25, at 157; see also Gerhardt, supra note 12, at
381–82 (describing the history of Senate voting with respect to separate
votes on removal and conviction, and finding that the Senate, with the
impeachment of Judge Halsted Ritter, “concluded then (and has taken the
position consistently since) that a single vote to convict is all that it is
required to do constitutionally.”).
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of removal separately from conviction would have to grapple with
that authority. Moreover, on another view, “conviction” is so intertwined with “removal” that the value of conviction must be determined in light of the value of removal in the scheme of national interests. Still, this seems to preclude the exercise of raw, lower-order
political judgments, those that account for a President’s popularity, a
lack of desire to see the current Vice-President elevated, or—perhaps
most often—a calculation about how the Senator’s own electoral fortunes would be affected by his vote on articles of impeachment.155 And
even where “higher” politics inform Political Nullification, it is a concession that the decision whether to convict involves something
beyond a finding of fact of guilt and a legal judgment about impeachability. The Senator must be prepared to explain why the Constitution permits an acquittal for a president who—in the Senator’s own
view—has in fact committed an impeachable offense.
A model based on the Anti-Nullification Approach that requires
the Senate to simply judge the facts, and that does not permit a judgment as to whether the conduct constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor, is structurally problematic. This model would make the
House the exclusive judge of the scope and meaning of the phrase
“high crimes or misdemeanors,” and would make the Senate bound by
that constitutional interpretation. There is, of course, a textual argument for this. If the “sole” power of impeachment lies in the House,156
and the power of impeachment assumes the exclusive power to determine what an impeachable offense is, then perhaps it makes some
sense to say that this is an interpretive job for the House and no other
body, not even the Senate. One is reminded of then-Representative
Gerald Ford’s observation that an impeachable offense “is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given
moment in history.”157 If Ford was correct—and there is every reason
to think he was not—then once the House has rendered its “sole”
judgment as to whether conduct constitutes an impeachable offense,
then, on this view, the Senate has no role in second-guessing. This
appears to have been the position of Senator Edmunds during the
Johnson impeachment.158
But if this is so, then it binds the Senate in a way that the Senate
is not otherwise bound by the judgments of the House in any other
155. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61 (examining various forms of political
considerations on impeachment, but conceding that “low politics” will be
a factor is an “otherwise justifiable” impeachment).
156. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.
157. 116 Cong. Rec. 11,913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Ford).
158. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. 424 (1868) (statement of
Sen. Edmunds).
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constitutional context. It would also remove an essential legal
decision-making problem from the Senate’s domain. Aside from ruling
on legal process questions, the Senate’s only judgment would be
factual. It also puts the Senate in an untenable position if the facts of
the underlying conduct are proven by the House managers. This is
because the Senate would then be bound to affirm the House’s interpretive decision about the nature of the conduct—i.e., whether it is
impeachable at all—and to remove the official from office, even if the
conduct was minor and, in the Senate’s judgment, not an impeachable
offense. The only other recourse under this model would be to vote
not guilty, even if it were clear that the impeached official had
committed the underlying conduct. The Anti-Nullification Approach
therefore could have the pernicious effect of actually inducing
nullification.
Moreover, if a court of impeachment really is more a hybrid
criminal law process, rather than a conventional political one, then
the Anti-Nullification Approach treats the House as both accuser and
law-giver. While this may track a conventional grand jury model, it
does not track a conventional criminal trial model, where the prosecutor is not the conclusive law-giver. This is yet another reason why
this approach may tend to accumulate power in the House in ways
that could frustrate the Senate’s role.
The Independent Approach—articulated by Black159 and Bloch,160
and applied by, among others, Senators Snowe161 and Jeffords162—thus
emerges as a sensible one when grounded in the notion of what it
means to “convict” and when combined with the structure of the Senate in the constitutional design. This approach preserves the quasicriminal–quasi-judicial nature of impeachment trials in the Senate, by
treating the Senate as a court that both finds facts and makes legal
judgments, as it is entitled to do on motions, for example, in a criminal law context. And yet this approach also stays true to the act of
deciding whether to convict—it permits a decision as to the factual
159. Black, supra note 48, at 13.
160. Bloch, supra note 25, at 159.
161. 145 Cong. Rec. S1,670-71 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Snowe).
162. Id. at S1,596–98 (statement of Sen. Jeffords). For another example of this
approach, as applied in judicial impeachment, see 156 Cong. Rec. S1,022
(daily ed. Mar. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Carl Levin of
Michigan voted to convict Judge Porteous, on multiple articles, but not
on article IV. In the process, Senator Levin stated that “it is up to each of
us to determine what actions reach the level of impeachable offenses
egregious enough to remove a federal officer such as a district court
judge.” Id.
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basis for the House’s allegations without permitting a separate
normative judgment about whether removal is appropriate, a decision
that this approach treats as having already been made, both constitutionally and by the related conclusion that the Party committed
an impeachable offense. It also gives the Senate the flexibility to make
judgments about the nature of the conduct at issue to ensure that,
even if a factual basis for the allegation is established, the Senate still
makes its own independent judgment as to impeachability. This
serves to check the ability of the House to engage in vindictive or
overzealous impeachments.
Of course, one might question this framework by saying, quite
rightly, that no Senator would explicitly invoke raw partisanship or
personal political considerations to justify a vote to acquit, just as no
Senator would invoke those factors in voting to convict. Political
Nullification, the argument goes, will always be covert, cloaked in
some higher-order justification or rationale. Consequently, one might
argue that one of the other approaches could serve as a convenient
subterfuge that simply amounts functionally to another form of Political Nullification. Senators, pursuant to this argument, could publicly
answer the question of impeachability or factual guilt in the negative,
simply because they ultimately believe that the official should not be
removed from office, even if, in truth, they are privately persuaded of
both guilt and impeachability. There is merit to these contentions,
and one imagines that such decision-making likely infected the voting
in President Clinton’s impeachment trial—perhaps even Senator
Snowe’s ultimate conclusion is an example of such an approach—or
President Johnson’s.163 To the extent that true Political Nullification
will always be covert, we may never know for sure. But to the extent
that Senators wish to give effect to higher order political concerns,
doing so through the Independent Approach—judging removability
through the lens of the “political” crimes model of “high crimes and
misdemeanors”—seems preferable to doing so through Political
Nullification.
Still, some cases are possible in which both factual guilt and impeachability will be clear. This would be particularly true where the
underlying impeachable offense that is alleged is bribery, proof of
which is far easier to discern because—like treason,164 but unlike the
163. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1,671 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Snowe).
164. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012).
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ill-defined “other high crimes and misdemeanors”—it is previously defined in our criminal law.165
For example, let us assume that the President is accused of accepting a bribe in exchange for public support of legislation and a vow
to sign the legislation when it is approved by Congress. Let us assume
further that the proof that the President engaged in the conduct is legally sufficient. Let us even further assume that the bribe was in a
relatively small amount and that it occurred only once, that the
President has no prior history of accepting or offering bribes, and that
the President is both popular and performing his other duties capably.
A Senator might believe that the conduct is sufficiently minor and
mitigated that it should not result in removal from office. And yet,
following the Independent Interpretation Approach, the Senator
would also be compelled to conclude that the conduct amounted to
bribery, which is plainly impeachable, and thus removable. In such a
situation, the Senator’s decision to acquit would have to be based on
nothing more than nullification in its purest form; it could not reasonably be based on a failure of proof or a failure to state an impeachable
offense.
There are, of course, other ways procedurally to maintain both
the legal and factual decision-making roles for the Senate without
compromising on the meaning of “conviction,” if we can say that
“conviction” means, at a minimum, a factual finding of guilt as it is
used in the Treason Clause and Thirteenth Amendment. To ensure
that the Senate has a legal, as well as factual, determination to make
and is not bound to the House’s determination, the Senate could
adopt a new procedure. The Senate could adopt a rule which allows it
to vote, as a threshold matter, on whether the alleged conduct, if
proven, constitutes treason, bribery, or a high crime and misdemeanor.166 Then, if a supermajority votes in the affirmative, the trial can
proceed. If not, the time and energy of an impeachment trial are not
spent; the Senate could dismiss the articles of impeachment, just like
a court could dismiss charges against a criminal defendant.

165. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (defining the crime of bribery and relevant terms).
166. Akhil Amar suggests something akin to this. See Amar, supra note 11, at
311. This is not the same as the “Findings of Fact” debate that the
Senate had during the Clinton impeachment, where the object was to
approve factual findings that the President engaged in the conduct of
which he was accused but to do so outside of the context of a vote on
conviction and removal, thus avoiding the unpopular notion of removing
him from office while still preserving a record of affirmative findings that
he had committed the alleged conduct. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1,118
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (objecting to a vote on
factual findings).
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This is hardly a perfect solution, however. Such a procedure would
require the Senate to make its legal judgment in the abstract, rather than
on the particulars of the case. Still, one resolution would be to permit the
issue to arise again in the form of a subsequent or renewed motion by any
Senator or by motion of the impeached party.
So whether the Senate uses a motion-like procedure to exercise its
legal judgment, or whether it does so by employing something akin to the
Independent Interpretation Approach articulated here, the Senate still is
capable of exercising judgment that fits a hybrid political-legal understanding of impeachment, without resort to an extra-legal process of Political Nullification.

III. The Limits of Impeachment as Politics
To defend politically-motivated acquittals on the ground that impeachment is inherently “political” is to overstate, if not misstate, the
political nature of impeachment.
Recall that Hamilton describes impeachment as political in the
sense that it involves offenses against the community and governing
instruments of civil society.167 In Federalist 65 and 66, he also responded to objections involving giving the Senate the power to try
impeachments—that, for example, courts would be better repositories
of such power and that Senate trials would intolerably aggrandize
senatorial power in the constitutional design.168 To fend off such
claims, he assured readers that—even knowing that impeachments
could begin as partisan exercises against a president—Senators can be
trusted to exercise sound judgment on impeachment, and they will
avoid corruption.169 Hamilton also referred to the fact that making the
Senate a court of impeachment was one way in which the Constitution mixes powers, giving one branch powers that might ordinarily
belong to another branch.170 While Hamilton never argued that Senators are exercising the full panoply of judicial power, his argument
nevertheless implies that when sitting as a court of impeachment, the
167. See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 394–95; see also Turley,
supra note 54, at 127–28 (explaining Hamilton’s particular use of the word
“political”).
168. See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 43, at 396; The Federalist
No. 66, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
169. See The Federalist No. 66, supra note 168, at 404-05; see also
Gerhardt, supra note 40, at 15–16 (discussing the Convention’s approach
to the vote required for conviction, and explaining that “[t]he delegates
saw the Senate as composed of well-educated, wealthy, virtuous citizens
who would be sure to have the Nation’s welfare at heart.”).
170. See The Federalist No. 66, supra note 168, at 399–400.
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Senate is transformed—it is assigned “the right of judging,” whereas
the House has the “right of accusing.”171 Consequently, if the Senate
were to act, and cast votes, using the same kinds of political calculations that it uses in performing its ordinary legislative business, there
would have been no need for Hamilton to refer to the mixture of
legislative and judicial power in impeachments; indeed, there would
have been no reason for opponents of this arrangement to object on
these grounds. The very fact that Senators are acting as judges was
the basis for the objection to which Hamilton responded, and offers
ample reason to think that Senators must decide impeachments without reference to ordinary political or electoral considerations.
Another reason to think this, drawn again from Hamilton and The
Federalist, has to do with the importance of holding presidents responsible. In Federalist 70, Hamilton offered his now famous explanation of the need for energy in the executive, a component of
which is unity.172 Unity is inconsistent with plurality, and a plural
executive is undesirable in part because it makes responsibility more
difficult to assess.173 “Responsibility,” Hamilton said, “is of two kinds
—to censure and to punishment.”174 Hamilton told his readers that
there must be a mechanism for presidential accountability—holding
presidents responsible for their misdeeds—but doing so is more
challenging when there are multiple individuals on whom to shift
blame.175 A plural executive, then, deprives the people of “the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the
persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to
their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.”176 Hamilton then
returned to responsibility as he closed his discussion of the executive,
in Federalist 77: having discussed the “requisites for energy,” does the
proposed executive have “the requisites to safety, in the republican
sense—a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?”177
Hamilton answered in the affirmative, and cited impeachment as evi-

171. See id. at 400.
172. The Federalist No. 70, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
173. Id. at 427.
174. Id. at 426.
175. Id. at 427–28.
176. Id. at 427.
177. The Federalist No. 77, at 462 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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dence of the Constitution’s safeguards for presidential responsibility.178
If a Senator believes that the President has committed an act that is
legitimately impeachable, then acquittal based on raw politics or
electoral calculations undermines the Senate’s role in assuring responsibility in the unitary executive. This, in turn, enables presidents
in their misconduct179 and threatens the ability of the legislature to
resist accumulations of presidential power. This is especially problematic if presidents attempt to use their position to influence Senate
voting, such as by staging rallies in the Senator’s home state or otherwise developing a base of popular support that could sway individual
Senators based on raw politics.
Senator Harkin’s view, then, may go too far in the other direction.
For when sitting as a court of impeachment, the Senate is transformed. It is still a political body, but it is not the same kind of political body as it normally is when its sits as a deliberative legislative
body. The normal incidents of politics, and political judgments, would
seem not to obtain when sitting for impeachment purposes.180 This is
particularly true once one considers the mandates of the constitutional text with respect to impeachments, including that the party must
be “convicted” with a supermajority of the Senate. Remember also
that when the impeachment clauses were initially discussed at the
Constitutional Convention, leading Framers like George Mason and
Elbridge Gerry wanted to add “maladministration” to the text as a
basis for impeachment.181 But that suggestion was defeated upon the
urging of James Madison, who thought that such a term would simply
permit “tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”182 This rejection in the
language of impeachment—well-covered in the impeachment literature—was designed to prevent impeachment from being a device for
removal upon mere political disagreement or petty conduct by the impeached Party.183 The Framers desired a standard less subject to
political or partisan manipulation. Recall also that the Framers took
care to make the Senate different than the House—more deliberative,
178. Id.; see also Gerhardt, supra note 40, at 93 (“By its very nature, the
impeachment process is reserved for Congress to demand an accounting
from the President regarding alleged abuses of his powers.”).
179. See Whittington, supra note 61 (stating that if the “big stick” of
impeachment is unused, “Congress might find that some who hold an
office of trust under the United States are emboldened to behave badly”).
180. See Tulis, supra note 57, at 237.
181. See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 550 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
182. Id. For more on the history of the debates over language in the
impeachment clauses, see Gerhardt, supra note 20, at 606–609.
183. See Berger, supra note 11, at 89–90; Black, supra note 48, at 30.
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more distant from popular passion and sentiment184—though some of
this was compromised by the Seventeenth Amendment.185 Structurally, then, the Senate is positioned to deliberate soberly and objectively as to the facts of an impeachment and the constitutional standard
for impeachment. The formalities—quasi-legal, and even quasicriminal—that the Framers devised for grappling with the subject of
impeachment would have been unnecessary if impeachment were to be
treated the same as any other legislative or political moment for the
Senate. And if raw partisanship ought not to be a reason for impeachment, conviction, and removal, then, arguably, neither should
raw partisanship be a basis for acquittal.
This is not to say that we can cleanse impeachment trials of all
partisan political considerations. Neal Katyal recognized this reality
and wrote that, “[p]olitics is inevitable in these high-stakes impeachment debates. And this is how it should be.”186 Katyal does not demand partisanship in impeachment decision-making, but rather is
contending that it is dangerous for moral, legal, and historical appeals
to mask ordinary political motivations.187 He is rightly concerned
about senatorial responsibility, and grounds his argument in the distinction between the judiciary and the Senate as a representative
body.188 Senators should, as Katyal notes, be transparent about political motivations. But, as Turley argues, the structural and procedural
mechanisms of impeachment offer a forum in which Senators can be
open about politics, but where the deliberative process can induce
Senators to use factual and legal judgments that override strictly partisan or politically expedient ones.189 Senators, then, may—and likely
will—bring their partisan or electoral concerns to the table at the
trial’s inception. But they should ultimately seek to subordinate those
motivations to higher-order concerns about guilt, constitutionalism,
and presidential responsibility.
Of course, one hopes that Senators could conduct all legislative
business in a manner that will “refine and enlarge the public view,”190
184. See The Federalist No. 63, at 381–82 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
185. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII (making Senators popularly elected).
186. See Katyal, supra note 149, at 176.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 176–77.
189. See Turley, supra note 54, at 128. Cf. Whittington, supra note 61
(distinguishing low, high, and constitutional politics, and stating that even
low politics will be factors in judging an otherwise justifiable
impeachment).
190. The Federalist No. 10, at 76 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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as Madison described it, and that Senators will “best discern the true
interest of their country” and not sacrifice it to “temporary or partial
considerations.”191 But the special nature of impeachment renders this
notion even more critical when Senators sit for that great purpose.

Conclusion
Although impeachment is political, it is important not to overstate its political nature. While Senator Harkin correctly said that
those who sit in judgment during an impeachment trial are “Senators”
and not strictly “jurors,” their senatorial attributes are now different
from those that attend ordinary legislative business. Of course, let us
not be naïve: perhaps Senators will do what they wish on impeachment, particularly when they have little or no disincentive to make it
up as they go. But Senators ought to adhere to a standard that is
most consistent with the constitutional text and the structure of the
Senate, which is transformed into a quasi-judicial body that determines facts and applies principles of constitutional and criminal law.
Such a process demands more uniformity and consistency, not less.
While the ultimate judgment may well rest within each Senator’s conscience, the Senator’s task on impeachment trials need not be wholly
subjectivized nor politicized. Within a constitutional design that
transforms the Senate into a quasi-judicial body, political nullification
by a court of impeachment—whether overt or covert—can do violence
to the rule of law, presidential responsibility, the institutional integrity of the Senate, and the separation of powers.

191. Id.
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